The Defence Data Strategy in review
The Defence Data Strategy 2021-2023 is a welcome initiative as Defence seeks to transition into an organisation capable of tackling the strategic security challenges of the 21st Century.
Released in August 2021 by Assistant Defence Minister Andrew Hastie, the strategy takes an enterprise approach to addressing the data challenge facing the Department. It is an ambitious document which takes the broadest view of data as an enterprise input and offers the expected mix of organisational response – creating new structures, and prioritising efforts with focused activities to be achieved against a demanding timeline.
The department has been talking about addressing the data problem for some time now, and the public release of an agreed strategy is a key milestone. Significantly, for those in industry who can offer solutions to assist Defence to corral its data and optimise its use, the strategy provides a framework and set of accountable officers against which, and to whom solutions can be presented.
The strategy sensibly includes the appointment of a Chief Data Integration Officer (CDIO), and the stand-up of supporting staff in a Data Division. This looks good on paper, but those in integration roles in Defence typically face an arm-wrestle to gain influence, and the strategy is quiet on how the CDIO will execute his/her role.
For example, the strategy does not explain how the CDIO will exert influence over the service chiefs and the capability programs they are responsible for (in their capacities as capability managers and domain leads). Nor does it attempt to explain how the CDIO will influence in-flight and future data-heavy capability programs being delivered by CASG and CIOG, or those programs delivering vital network and network security capabilities which a data strategy is utterly reliant upon.
The strategy does note that a Defence Data Management Board (DDMB) will be established and report into the Enterprise Business Committee, but this is not where the key data decisions for warfighting capabilities are made. It only mentions that the DDMB may report to the Investment Committee (IC) or Defence Committee (DC) as required. There is no mention of the DDMB having a relationship with the Joint Warfare Committee (JWC) or subordinate forums where capability solutions and warfighting concepts come together.
Of course the usual question looms whenever we see such documents, will the strategy be adequately resourced? Is new money attached, or will it be a resource-neutral exercise with resources harvested from across the portfolio?
Finding the additional APS and ADF workforce to populate the new Data Division working for CDIO may prove challenging unless there are new positions created. And even then, getting the necessary expertise in the door on APS and ADF salaries may prove challenging. Appointing data custodians in each service and group is an important initiative, but will these individuals be double-hatted, or will they be new positions with a sole focus on addressing data challenges?
By taking an enterprise view of the data challenge, the strategy has had no choice but to declare some priority areas of focus. This is perhaps the greatest concern – the priorities that are listed, and the ones that are not. The strategy reads like a document prioritising the remediation of enterprise/business data challenges, rather that the data needs of those who will go in harm’s way.
A quick look at the priority areas the document will focus on underscores this. It states that it will focus on five key areas of remediation – workforce, capability delivery, organisational capacity, strategic taskforces, and the health and well-being of service personnel and veterans. These are all important areas worthy of remediation – and most provide direct inputs into ADF capability – but are these the right priorities?
The only reference to operational functions occurs under the discussion of strategic taskforces, and here it only mentions recent crisis responses other that warfighting. For example, it notes Defence’s recent support to bushfire assistance, COVID, the IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry, and the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide.
These strategic taskforces are important and do need trusted, available data. But with billions to be spent on advanced warfighting platforms and capabilities in the next 10-20 years, this strategy might have included as a priority, a program of work to ensure these platforms have the data and networks they need to function correctly.
The biggest gap in the document is in its cursory discussion of data as a bona fide warfighting capability – the word ‘warfighting’ appears only twice in the document. While it acknowledges the changing strategic environment – referencing Defence Strategic Update 2020 (DSP 20) and the challenge Defence will have maintaining its advanced warfighting edge – the strategy pays little attention to the data needs of the platforms and systems that commanders, soldiers, sailors, and airmen will operate tomorrow and over the next 20 years.
The DSP 20 states up front that Defence, “must be better prepared for the prospect of high-intensity conflict”, yet this call to arms doesn’t seem to have attracted the attention of the Defence Data Strategy’s authors. There is scant recognition and little consideration given to the fact that almost all of the ADF’s future warfighting capabilities are data-hungry and that, without validated and verified operational mission data, they will not generate the full suite of operational effects the systems are designed to achieve.
There is also no reference to HQ Joint Operations Command (HQ JOC) or Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) anywhere in the strategy. In addition to the capability domain leads and capability mangers, CJOPS is a key stakeholder when it comes to Defence’s warfighting data.
While capability delivery is flagged as a priority area, the accompanying narrative indicates data remediation activities will be more focused on programmatics and being able to optimise the performance of programs and projects. Both of these are worthy goals, but the way it is written in the strategy it doesn’t seem to address the hard task of ensuring warfighting mission systems have the data they need.
Finally, the strategy talks about including data as a component of the Command and Management Fundamental Input into Capability (FIC) element, but this is not exactly a new idea. The 2020 Capability Manual notes that ‘information’, including intelligence information, is an element of the Command and Management FIC. It could be argued warfighting data is so critical to our future warfighting capability that it should appear within the Major Systems FIC, or have a FIC of its own!
In summary, the strategy is very ambitious. The draft timeline and the description of work-packages and initiatives indicate Defence is preparing for a marathon, not a sprint.
This is appropriate, as the data remediation task is significant and, providing this effort is resourced, improved outcomes should accrue. The governance of this effort – while looking a little messy with the CDIO reporting to both VCDF and the Associate Secretary – is logical, as VCDF and the Associate Secretary between them, oversee the key warfighting capability and business enterprise capability decision-making bodies.
Time will tell whether this model proves effective in enabling CDIO to influence the myriad projects and programs upon which this data remediation effort is dependent. At this early stage, the main concern is one of priorities, particularly the absence of a substantive discussion of the data needs of warfighters and the platforms and mission systems they are expected to operate. Adding ‘warfighting data’ as a priority area to the data strategy is recommended as a first step to address this gap.
Without this inclusion, Defence runs the risk of the warfighting data requirement being relegated; missing the opportunity to design a genuine warfighting data framework and to set data formats and standards that OEMs address when offering platforms and capabilities.
Stephen Beaumont is the Principal of Start To Finish Consulting P/L, a company providing advisory services to Defence Industry. Stephen retired from full-time Army service in early 2020 as a Brigadier, his final appointment being within Joint Capabilities Group, Information Warfare Division leading the Joint Cyber, EW, and ISR Programs.
This article appeared in the July/August 2021 issue of ADBR.